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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a conceptual paper that adds to the project management and organisation 
literatures by addressing the problem of management in industries that are based upon 
market-organised projects, due to the characteristics of their product innovation 
processes.  
“Projects” are defined here as constituted by different skill-holders (economic agents with 
specialized and complementary competencies) collaborating over a pre-determined time 
period for completing a pre-specified (and sometimes one-off) complex task. It is 
precisely the complexity of a task that necessitates the coordination of ⎯ typically 
multidisciplinary ⎯ skills that it is not economically efficient to bring together on a 
permanent basis. Most of the literature within the research tradition on projects has 
focused upon projects where (most) participating skill-holders are individuals employed 
within the same firm (i.e., “project teams”), and the main managerial question related to 
such projects has been about internal processes of employment contracts, planning, 
control, leadership, etc. (Gaddis, 1959; Middelton, 1967). Recently, however, the 
literature on projects is bulging with perspectives on projects carried out (mainly) in the 
market (Ekinsmyth, 2002; Faulkner & Anderson, 1987; Robins, 1993; Sydow & Staber, 
2002). In such cases, participating skill-holders are employed in different firms, or may 
be freelancers. This paper focuses upon such market-based projects (i.e., ”project 
networks”)(Grabher, 2002c; Jones & and DeFillipi, 1996; Staber, 2004; Starkey, Barnatt, 
& Tempest Sue, 2000). 
While the emerging literature on market-organised projects provide ample examples of 
the effects of such projects, we still don’t know much about what drives this form of 
organisation, i.e. when and why firms choose to organize projects on the market rather 
than keeping them in-house. And we know even less about how projects that are 
organized on the market are managed: Given the absence of asset ownership, 
employment contracts, and other forms of firm-internal management, how do 
participants obtain their goals while holding down time and other costs? Some scholars 
(e.g. Grabher, 2002b; 2002c) give us a hint that the geographical clustering which we 
see in many project-based industries may play a positive role for market-organised 
projects, but how such clustering relates to issues of management is still relatively 
unexplored.  
For illustration, consider the Recorded Music industry. Every new music CD can be seen 
as a discrete product innovation, with new content (and, often, also a new marketing 
campaign), and is created in a temporary project that brings together, amongst others, 
musicians, producers, sales and marketing people. But, even if distribution is dominated 
by major global corporations, product innovation is done in market-organized networks 
of independent freelancing artists and small specialized firms, often localized in particular 
cities. Why? And how are such complex and temporary networks managed? 
This paper addresses the following research questions: 
1. What determines the organization of projects (and the boundaries of firms 
engaged in projects), i.e. when are projects internal to firms and when are they 
organized on the market?  
2. How are market-organised projects managed? 
3. What is the role of geographical clustering for such management? 
The paper is, as mentioned, conceptual, and brings together two literatures that 
potentially have much to gain from each other: The research on project management 
and the research on industrial organization. Whereas the former literature mostly 
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originates from within management and organization studies, the latter is a mostly 
economic research tradition, enquiring into how coordination among different economic 
activities is achieved under different organizational regimes. This tradition has undergone 
tremendous growth during the last decades, represented by e.g. competence 
perspectives (e.g. Richardson, 1972), the transaction cost perspective (e.g., Williamson, 
1985; Williamson, 2000), and other contract perspectives (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1986; 
Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1994; Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998). However, this tradition has 
largely been preoccupied with the one question of whether different economic activities 
will be internalized in single firms or undertaken at the market, paying little attention to 
how markets become organized (and hence come to resemble firms in some respects) to 
allow for coordination of the many activities that are not internalized (Maskell and 
Lorenzen, 2004).1 Furthermore, the economic organization literature has hardly paid any 
attention to temporary forms of organization, such as projects. In this paper, we seek to 
remedy this neglect, connecting core arguments from the economic organization 
literature ⎯ i.e., its focus upon institutions such as contracts, competencies, rules, 
norms, languages and so on ⎯ in order to investigate the management of markets in 
project-based industries. 
The paper illustrates its theoretical argument with an empirical case study of the 
Recorded Music industry. This industry is an example of an industry that, for reasons 
related to product innovation, is organized in projects, and these projects are 
predominantly organised on the market. While other Entertainment industries with 
prominent market-organized projects have been discussed in some length by e.g. 
Storper (1989); Storper and Chistophersen (1987), and Blair (2001), the Recorded Music 
industry remains an interesting and understudied case. In this paper, we present an 
analysis of this industry’s projects: Why they are organized on the market rather than 
within firms, and how they are managed. We also discuss why many projects within the 
Recorded Music industry are geographically clustered.  
The paper is organized thus. In section 2 below, we introduce the issues of projects and 
project-based industries, giving a brief insight into the project literature, but also 
expanding upon this literature by briefly discussing projects in relation to innovation. We 
argue that projects are efficient for product innovation within particular industries that 
innovate through experimentation. 
However, the project literature offers little insights into how projects are organized in 
such industries. In section 3, we tackle this question, by investigating theoretically what 
we could call “the economics of project organization”, i.e. when it is most efficient to 
keep projects in-house and when market-organised projects are more efficient. We 
investigate which skill-holders (firms, employees, and freelancers) participate to projects, 
whether projects are internalized in single firms or marked-organised, and how projects 
are connected inside or outside firms. We argue that supplementing our insights into the 
internal economies of firms with an understanding of the economies of markets allows us 
to better understand the organization of such industries.  
Section 4 addresses the second of our research questions, namely how management of 
market-organised projects takes place. A key characteristic of project-based industries is 
that projects rest upon the collaboration of skill-holders with both differing competencies 
and motivations. In particular, labor markets of freelancers are crucial. Hence, a key task 
for management is to make sure that the behavior of differing skill-holders participating 
to projects is aligned.  In the section, we take advantage of economic organization 
literature (notably, transaction cost economics, which has only to a very limited extent 
been used in the current literature on projects), in order to discuss which mechanisms 
are available to managers to secure coordination among agents ⎯  not only within a 
                                          
1 As Langlois (1986: 6) puts it, “ The coordination of economic activity in not merely a matter of 
price-mediated transactions in markets, but is supported by a wide range of economic and social 
institutions that are themselves an important topic of theoretical economic inquiry”. 
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single firm, but on the market. We argue that a project-based industry rests upon a 
particular combination of complementary coordination mechanisms, some person-
embodied, other embedded in particular institutions (e.g. contracts, property rights, 
competencies, rules, norms, and languages).  The embeddedness ⎯  in particular 
geographical locations ⎯  of persons with leadership and boundary spanning skills, is an 
explanation for the notable geographical clustering of projects in a range of industries. 
In section 5, the paper illustrates this chain of arguments empirically by taking a closer 
look upon the Recorded Music industries. This industry is characterized by product 
innovation through experimentation and project organization. Through a step-by-step 
analysis of innovation projects (i.e., the invention, production, and sales of new music on 
CDs), we illustrate how our theoretical framework is useful for understanding why music 
projects are  market-based and how they are managed on the market. Furthermore, our 
framework provides an explanation of why particular parts of the Recorded Music 
industry is geographically clustered. 
 
 
2. PROJECT-BASED INDUSTRIES 
 
The “project” ⎯  a temporary collaboration of different skill-holders over a pre-
determined time period for completing a pre-specified complex task ⎯  has been around 
since antiquity as a way of organizing one-off activities, or activities not occurring 
frequently enough to support more permanent organizations ⎯ from building the Egypt 
pyramids to the Apollo space project (Engwall et al., 2003). Projects are deliberate but 
not fixed organizational designs, and they vary in duration, size, budget, and activity 
area (furthermore, many projects exceed their deadlines and budgets). 
 
Projects and product innovation 
Organizing different skill-holders temporarily flexibly in a project is an open-ended and 
dynamic principle of organizing, likely to change in course of the project’s lifetime. For 
that reason, projects have also always been used for delivering “change” (Hobday, 
2000). To a growing extent, academic attention is now paid to such innovative 
capabilities of projects. For example, it is debated whether projects are on the rise within 
some industries with high innovation rates (Hobday, 2000; Gann and Salter, 2000; 
Grabher, 2002a; Lampel & Shamsie, 2003; Sydow & Staber, 2002).2  
Even if we also find projects in process innovation, most cases testify to the innovative 
abilities of projects for product innovation (even the pyramids and the Appollo projects 
can be seenn as ⎯  admittedly outstanding ⎯  products). Projects are of particular 
relevance for product innovation in industries depending upon the continuous creation of 
products with new content or traits, i.e. not (or to a neglectable extent) incorporating 
elements of earlier products.3 We may call such products product originals.  They come 
about through “episodic innovation” (Acha et al., 2005), i.e. discrete acts of innovation 
with the end aim of producing a new product. 
                                          
2 (Ekstedt et al., 1999) argue that projects may be a principle of growing relevance in all 
industries. 
3 Hence, this category of industries are basically different from those based upon incremental 
product innovation, i.e. new knowledge built on top of existing knowledge, often in small steps. 
Such industries are typically characterized by parametric demand uncertainty (Langlois and 
Robertson 1995), i.e., where consumer tastes undergo relatively predictable changes and the 
technological design space (Stankiewicz, 2000) for products is well defined. Examples of such 
industries encompass machine tools and many consumer goods, such as furniture and household 
electronics.  
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A few product originals have radically new functions and are connected to structural 
uncertainty and the rise of new industries or technological trajectories (Langlois and 
Robertson 1995).4 But most product originals contain no radically new functions, rather, 
they are created in order to fulfil demands on existing markets.  
 
Customization and differentiation 
For this type of products, we may distinguish two main ways of creating originals. 
First, product customization is when unique first-time solutions are developed to meet 
the specific demands of a client. Coming up with an original, customized, product in this 
way is what we often see in the construction industry: Many houses are highly 
customized products, and the construction of them entails adapting to unique physical 
condition of the building site and solving a range of unexpected problems. We also often 
see customization in business service industries (Tether, 2005; Acha et al., 2005), such 
as design, consultancy, and advertising. Even if it has often been claimed that some 
advertising campaigns constitute much more original products than many consultancy 
services (innovated through “applied” rather than “real” creativity)(Hill and Johnson, 
2003), we shall refrain from going into a debate of degrees of customization here.  
Second, product differentiation is a way of seeking competitiveness on consumer markets 
where cost-based competition has been replaced by “values” or “experiences” (Pine and 
Gilmore, 1999) and where product cycles are short. Differentiation is coming up with a 
product that satisfies similar consumer demands as incumbent products by almost full 
substitution (Burke 1996).5 Coming up with an original, differentiated, product in this 
way is what we see in for example, Entertainment industries like film or computer 
games, where products with new stories, designs or functionalities replace older versions, 
before product cycles turn again and new differentiated films or games capture the 
demand. 
 
Experimentation  
A common trait of customization and differentiation is that they both often entail open-
ended innovation under demand uncertainty (Knight, 1921) or experimentation (Nelson 
and Winter 1982; Rosenberg 1992; Foss and Foss 2002). Experimentation entails trying 
out a solution in order to find out whether it works or not ⎯  in other words, innovating a 
product without knowing whether it will work or not. In product customization, in many 
cases, it may be necessary to commence innovation before the customer has 
communicated her needs and specified her wants to the supplier of the product, because 
the customer may not be aware of these traits from the outset. In such cases, product 
customization encompasses experimentation as search (Dosi, 2000), where the supplier 
of the customized product needs to hold possible solutions and product traits open from 
the outset, and explore them through trial-and-error and feedback from the customer in 
an iterative process. In product differentiation, in some consumer industries, “nobody 
knows” (Caves, 2000), i.e., there is high demand uncertainty in terms of unforeseeable 
changes in consumer tastes. Here, product differentiation needs to be open-ended 
invention and new products need to be tested on consumers, over limited (if often 
flexible) test periods (Raubitschek, 1988; Kekre and Srinivasan, 1990)). 
Projects is a efficient way of experimentation, whether through searching for 
customization or testing for differentiation, because projects are organic and flexible 
                                          
4 The innovation literature typically focuses upon radical innovation, in particularly that which is 
“high-tech” (i.e., based upon high R&D investments).  
5 Hence, a differentiated product is not “novel” in the sense of a radical innovation causing industry 
turbulence or even rise of new markets and industries. However, like novel product originals, 
differentiated product originals may create Schumpeterian rents, albeit more temporary. 
 5   
 
structures for negotiation and experimentation in the early phases of innovation (Burns 
and Stalker 1961). This is the reason why industries with product originals and a high 
rate of innovation are predominantly project-based.  
In industries with product customization, organizing skill-holders with highly 
complementary skills in temporary projects is strictly necessary in order to find solutions 
to a specific customer’s demand within a specified time period  (Ekstedt et al. 1999; 
Hobday 2000; Grabher 2002). In some projects set up to customize a product, the client 
also needs to participate actively in the project to ensure customization. For example, 
construction or advertising firms “customize” a temporary group of skill-holders 
according to the demands of the client they serve, with the clients actively inputting to 
the product innovation process.  
In consumer industries with product differentiation, each project is an experiment 
(Goodman and Goodman 1976). In such industries, rather than relying on inputs from 
buyers (who cannot be involved like is the case in customizing industries), the skill-
holders participating to projects have to be able to create and advance a constant flow of 
product originals, testing them to see if they match unforeseeable consumer demands 
through a range of both parallel and successive projects (Lorenzen and Frederiksen, 
2003). Hence, economic selection can be made efficient, weeding out unsuccessful 
products by terminating projects. Efficient selection allows for a high rate of 
experimentation, necessary in industries where economies of speed (Galbraith, 1995) are 
important (i.e., industries with short product life cycles and short time-to-market). For 
example, the production of new films and music CDs in the Entertainment industries is 
kept constantly high, and these industries are also known to give up on producing (or, if 
production is complete, marketing) particular products if consumer feedback is 
unfavourable. 
 
3. THE ORGANIZATION OF PROJECTS AND THE BOUNDARIES OF FIRMS 
 
In any economy, competencies (or, in Hayek’s (1945) formulation, knowledge) are 
ultimately distributed to individual skill-holders, i.e people (Ekstedt et al. 1999).6 A 
project basically “orchestrates” (Andersen and Miles, 1999) such people and their 
competencies temporarily, in order to obtain a given goal. In some cases, all the skill-
holders needed for a project can be found internally in one firm (i.e., their employment 
contracts are permanent relative to freelancers (Alchian and Demsetz 1972)). A project 
can then be regarded as a project team internal to that firm (Middleton 1967), and the 
scope for management is internal. Many projects, however, need to incorporate skills 
held by people who are freelancers or employed in different firms. Such projects take the 
form of temporary market-organised (i.e., traded among legal ”persons” ⎯ individuals or 
firms) networks of skill-holders: Project networks (Jones 1996), and management needs 
to transcend the boundaries of firms. 
What, then, determines the organisation of a project-based industry ⎯  or, put 
differently, where the skills are found and whether projects will be predominantly team-
based or will need to transcend the boundaries of firms? Why do most advertising firms 
permanently employ both text writers; art directors; and controllers to undertake a range 
of different tasks, when a building contractor contracts away the execution of all 
construction work, employing mostly controllers? And why do software firms and many 
capital goods producers (e.g producers of aeroengines) internalize the innovation and 
production of their products, when film companies leave the production of their core 
product, feature films, to a wide network of specialized freelancers or small firms? 
                                          
6 Just as most scholars view firms as the most basic economic agents, many also refer to firms as 
the principal holders of skills or competencies (e.g., Richardson, 1972). For our analytical purpose, 
however, we view individual persons as the most relevant unit of analysis. 
 6   
 
 
Project economies of scale and scope 
We shall answer that question by looking at the “economics of projects”. Whether 
projects will be kept within the boundaries of the firms selling the end products in an 
industry (in the above examples, advertising firms, building contractors, software/capital 
goods producers and film companies) can be explained by the economic efficiency of 
carrying out projects in-house vs. on the market.  We analyse “efficiency” by comparing  
(Friedman, 1953) the internal vs. market scale and scope economies (advantages) of 
projects (Direricx and Cool,1989). Let us look at these in turn. 
First, scale economies of projects are the advantages of undertaking a portfolio of similar 
projects, either parallel or in succession. One advantage of parallel similar projects is that 
dedicated resources and specialized labour can be used with little redundancy. Inside a 
firm, this would mean little idleness, and in a market, low unemployment rates. Another 
advantage of parallel projects is knowledge spillovers among projects. Inside a firm, such 
spillovers would take the shape of meetings and consultations among staff with similar 
tasks, in a market, flows of labor among firms or informal know-how trading among 
workers from rival firms (von Hippel, 1987). This scale advantage is not just dependent 
upon a portfolio of parallel similar projects, it is underscored by successive similar 
projects, because there may be spillovers from one project to the next, and people need 
experience from earlier projects to be able to learn from a parallel project. A last scale 
advantage, which is mainly connected to successive projects, is the creation of 
specialized support institutions to support. Inside a firm, such institutions would 
encompass routines, as well as technical and educational support structures and various 
physical facilities catering to particular types of labour. On a market, institutions arising 
in connection to successive similar projects would be union regulations, specialized 
education and training offers, public law and insurance regimes, etc. Even if these 
institutions are built in order to support successive projects, it often also takes a number 
of parallel similar projects in order for firms or other agents to devote efforts and 
investments into them. 
Second, scope economies of projects are the advantages of undertaking a portfolio of 
different projects, either parallel or in succession. One advantage of different types of 
projects running in parallel may be that there is less competition for specialized labour 
and resources than would be the case for similar projects, demanding similar inputs. A 
more notable scope advantage ⎯  of both parallel and successive projects ⎯  is a high 
learning rate: The diversity of information and inspiration spilling among different 
projects may stimulate project participants to learning from diversity (March, 1991; 
Florida, 2002).7 While there are important scope advantages related to resource 
utilization and knowledge spillovers related to different projects, a high diversity means 
that there are relatively fewer advantages in terms of common institution-building. 
In order for a form of organization ⎯  in our comparison, either a firm or the market ⎯  
to reap scale and scope economies, the challenge is to allocate people and other 
resources between projects with low costs. As mentioned in section 2, the notable 
potential costs of projects are both fiscal (budget overruns) and time (delays). Hence, a 
comparatively efficient organization form for projects needs to be able to shift people and 
other resources between parallel projects, or transfer them to successive projects, with 
low “slack and lag”.  In the following, we shall compare the scale and scope project 
economies of firms and markets, respectively. 
 
                                          
7 However, limits to how different projects can be for people to learn across projects: With very 
different projects may provide little new inspirations to each other. 
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Internal Economies of Projects 
In the logic outlined above, projects are likely to be undertaken within firms ⎯  i.e., 
single firms will build resources needed for projects internally (in particular, employ skill-
holders on a full-time basis) ⎯ in the cases when firms are comparatively more efficient 
in reaping project scope and scope economies. 
A very basic observation is that firms are generally poor at reaping some types of scale 
and scope economies relative to markets, exactly because firms are relatively permanent 
bundles of resources created through dedicated investments over time (Penrose, 1959; 
Peteraf, 1993). As stipulated in section 2, one of the main advantages of projects is that 
they, through bringing different resources and skill-holders together temporarily, allow 
for flexibility and open-ended innovation. But, due to the costs firms sink into their 
resources and employees (Sutton, 1991), they have to maximize their utilization, 
employing them as first-choice for any given project. If firms choose to employ only a 
limited supply of resources and skills for projects, namely those under their own 
ownership and employment, they often severely hamper the flexibility and openness of 
their projects. So simply put, if a project entails the need for new and shifting resources 
and skills, such a project would enjoy are few internal economies. 
These limitations stipulated, let us look at the remaining project economies of scale and 
scope of a firm. A firm is set up to reap particular scale and scope advantages of the 
activities it undertakes, i.e. use it resources with as high degree of utilization and as little 
slack as possible. If a firm undertakes projects rather than ongoing activities, it needs to 
align its portfolio of parallel projects as well as its succession of projects in a way that 
makes good use of the firm’s resources. A firm is basically a mode of organization with 
particular institutions (Williamson, 1985; 2000). It uses particular mechanisms of 
governance and planning in order to coordinate and govern labour. It needs to draw 
upon these to maximize internal scale and scope advantages of projects. But there may 
be limits to how these institutions allow firms to take advantage of its project portfolio. 
Let us look at governance and planning in turn. 
Concerning governance, a firm employs a host of mechanisms such as employment 
contracts (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998) and a dominant set 
of visions and ideas (Loasby 2000) in order to motivate the skill-holders of its projects: 
Its employees. However, if skill-holders are very diverse, subscribe to diverse world 
views, and need to motivated differently, the efficiency of internal employment contracts 
and shared visions fades. For example, Osterloh and Frey (2000) argue that if people 
with intrinsic motivation  (i.e. fun and learning) as well as people with extrinsic 
motivations (i.e. contracts and incentives) are integrated in the same firm, 
communication difficulties may decrease its performance. The result, they argue, is that 
in many firms, extrinsic motivation crowds out intrinsic. Of course, this means that some 
skill-holders who are motivated intrinsically cannot be integrated into such firms. In the 
case where assets (skill-holders) are so diverse, there are no internal scale efficiencies.  
A firm is also a arena for internal day-to-day planning  (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Galbraith, 1995). In the cases where the use of skills related to projects can be efficiently 
planned in order to reap the advantages of having an entire portfolio of projects within 
one firm, internal management may pay. However, if projects are difficult to plan, 
internal scale and scope advantages erode. Of course, this depends on the nature of the 
skills in question, as well as upon the length and nature of the tasks encompassed in 
projects. Skills that are used for the entire duration of projects, ”core” skills (Atkinson 
1985; Jones et al. 2003), may be internalized into one firm if this firm can efficiently plan 
their use in its successive similar projects. For example, most consultancy and 
advertising firms have weekly planning meetings in order to make sure that consultants 
and controllers finishing one project are shifted to a new with as little slack as possible. 
However, if project durations are relatively short, uneven, or unforeseeable (for example, 
if many projects need to be terminated before time), such planning becomes difficult 
(Dvir and Lechler, 2004). Skills that are not used for projects’ entire duration (often, 
because they are extremely specialized), ”peripheral” skills, can still be internalized in a 
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firm if this firm through planning can realize scale and scope advantages of its portfolio 
of parallel projects, through flexibly allocating tasks from several projects to specialized 
skill-holders in order to keep them busy. For example, some advertising firms choose to 
employ photographers full-time rather than using freelancers, constantly shifting them 
around to different photo tasks in different projects, and this rests upon considerable 
planning. However, if many re-allocations of tasks are needed, such planning also 
becomes very demanding. Furthermore, realizing scale advantages does not depend 
upon planning alone, it also depends upon the size of the firm’s market (Smith, 1776). In 
the case of advertising, few firms are sufficiently big to be able to take full advantage of 
a full-time employed photographer’s skills. And virtually no advertising firms are so big 
as to employ film directors full-time. 
With high specialization of skills and complexity of projects, the problems of motivation 
increase and the costs of planning grow to the point that it erodes internal project 
economies. As noted, there is likely to be fewest advantages of internalizing highly 
specialized skill-holders. The core employees of the firms selling end products are likely 
to be those able to work as generalists on several types of projects, because they will 
infer the lowest planning costs, along with controllers and ”boundary spanners” 
(Tushmann & Katz 1980) whose function it is to manage and plan projects.  For example, 
many advertising firms employ a core group of generalists (flexible text writers and art 
directors) along with managers and controllers, the latter taking care of both internal 
project planning as well as external hiring of freelancing specialists (such as 
photographers, composers, directors, models, and so on).   
 
Market Economies of Projects 
We can now propose that the market is a more efficient form of organization for projects 
under two (not mutually exclusive) conditions: 
• When projects need to include new and shifting resources and skills; 
• When motivations of skill-holders and the nature of tasks render internal 
governance and planning inefficient.  
Both these conditions apply to complex, open-ended, innovation projects with very 
specialized skill-holders. Hence, we can expect industries with such skill-holders and 
projects to be dominated by project networks rather than project teams.8 The structure 
of such industries is, of course, characterized by relatively small firm sizes and high 
specialization of firms that constantly participate to a range of project networks.  
Because, as mentioned, specialization depends on the extent of the market (Smith, 
1776), specialized firms depend upon a certain minimum number of projects in order to 
survive.  For such firms, the key question of organization is not how big a portfolio of 
projects can efficiently be managed internally in order to reap scope and scale 
advantages ⎯  rather, the issue is how big a portfolio of market-based projects it is most 
efficient for the firm to be involved in at a time. Grabher (2002a; 2002b; 2002c) refers 
to a market context with an abundance of parallel as well as successive projects, offering 
work for specialized firms and freelancers, as a project ecology. It is characteristic for 
such ecologies that its firms and freelancers tend to keep the majority of their project 
relations among themselves (Grabher 2002a; Engwall 2002; Davis and Brady 2000). 
Hence, the ecology becomes the arena for what we may call external scale and scope 
economies of projects: Trade among firms in shifting project networks functions to 
allocate resources among parallel as well as successive projects with little slack and lag, 
                                          
8 However, some firms may choose to internalize some highly specialized skill-holders in spite of 
the lack of internal efficiency of managing them, for strategic reasons ⎯ in order to ensure easy 
access to them or to prevent competitors from internalizing them. 
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and firms learn from each other through knowledge spillovers (Lorenzen and Maskell, 
2004).  
The innovation capacity of market-organized projects is huge, compared to firm-internal 
projects. Even relatively stable ecologies ⎯ with the same firms participating over time 
⎯ may allow for a high rate of experimentation (Ibert, 2004). Due to project 
organization, economic selection weed out more projects (products), than firms in an 
ecology. Such selection operating at project level is both more rapid and cheaper than 
selection operating at firm level. For example, even with many films flopping in the film 
industry, most firms and artists survive by spreading risks, participating to parallel 
projects and thus experimenting with several products at a time. Hence, their managerial 
and artistic competencies are not lost to the film industry, even with a high rate of 
product failures. Project organization means that agents who may be tomorrow’s winners 
are not weeded out together with today’s losers (Carlsson and Eliasson 2001). 
Project ecologies also encompass labour. As noted, highly specialized skill-holders who do 
not participate during the entire lifespan of projects are very often market-based 
(freelancers), as the market is more efficient in allocating work to them (they have a 
portfolio of freelance work), and few firms have the size to alone allocate enough 
projects to them. Furthermore, many freelancers choose this lifestyle rather than full-
time employment in or affiliation to just one firm for motivation reasons (Florida, 2002). 
In a project-based industry, the complementary combination in ecologies consisting of 
specialized firms and specialized freelancers allows single firms to have access to the 
appropriate skills with minimal fixed wage costs and hence high numerical labor flexibility 
(Atkinson, 1985). 
Labor market effects in ecologies play an important role for the management of projects 
on such markets. We shall turn to these effects in the following section. 
 
4. THE MANAGEMENT OF MARKET-BASED PROJECTS 
 
Above, we discussed the organization of project-based industries, concluding that there 
is often a lack of internal economies of projects, and that means that many projects are 
carried out on the market. What, then, is the scope for management? The organizational 
economics literature (e.g. Williamson, 1985; 2000) tells us that market-organised 
projects may be faced with a range of potential market coordination problems stemming 
from information asymmetries and interest conflicts and cognitive distances. What can 
managers do faced with such problems? 
 
Coordination problems 
While coordination problems may be present in all project types (including project teams 
internal to firms), they may be particularly severe in project networks that cross firm 
boundaries. Let us take a closer look at these problems. 
First, marked-based projects may have a basic problem with allocating tasks at the right 
time. Without an efficient information dissemination system (which in a firm is often 
centralized and merged with planning), there may be huge time costs in market-
organised projects. Second, there may be governance problems arising from poorly 
aligned information and conflicting interests (Williamson 1985; 2000). Specialized skill 
holders, besides possessing different skills, also have different sources of information, 
motivations, and often interests. This may be relevant in the relationship between 
business firms or between freelancers, but a special problem may arise when the 
behavior of freelancers with intrinsic motivations and particular, often trust-based 
lifestyles need to be coordinated with business firms where extrinsic motivation and 
contract writing is the norm. In order to overcome such governance problems, project 
participants may have to pay high transaction costs (resource costs of searching, 
 10   
 
negotiating, and writing market contracts)(Williamson 1985; 2000). In projects that are 
aimed at innovating new products through collaborating with shifting partners, 
transaction costs, being “dynamic”, may be particularly high (Langlois and Robertson 
1995). Third, the participants to market-organised projects may, besides possessing 
different skills, also differ culturally in terms of beliefs, expectations, languages, norms, 
and practices. The result of such cognitive distances may be communication problems, 
and ultimately resource costs of misunderstandings (Foss and Lorenzen, 2003). 
Long-lasting market relations ⎯ such as supplier networks or strategic alliances ⎯ often 
develop strong informal institutions to overcome (some of) the above coordination 
problems, such as networked trust and shared codebooks for communication (Lorenzen 
2002; Maskell and Lorenzen 2004)9. Temporary in nature, projects cannot develop as 
strong institutions, because collective experiences and knowledge assets are often 
dispersed after a project is dissolved. Instead, the market becomes organized (Lorenzen 
and Maskell, 2004) in other ways in order to facilitate coordination of projects. 
 
Coordination through Contracts 
A first type of coordination mechanism on the market may be written contracts. Some 
project networks are set up by one dominant firm selling the end product of the project 
(for example, a film company). This firm may, without ownership of the skills involved, 
take on a role coordinating them through active management ⎯ typically, determining 
the variety range and time allowed for the project, and imposing rules, payment 
structures, or other governance mechanisms that help to align incentives among project 
participants, and defining blueprints and standards in order to overcome cognitive 
conflicts. Some projects initiated jointly by (most) participants and no dominating agent 
may also seek to solve coordination problems through contracts or other written 
coordination mechanisms. 
For most projects, what can be specified are the end tasks of and the conditions for the 
project, not its processes. There is a limit to specification in the many projects that are 
set up to produce product originals through experimentation. Many such projects have 
fluent job descriptions, loose organizational charts, and low authority (Visser & Dankbaar 
2002). In particular, projects set up to experiment need to be coordinated flexibly. In 
some project networks, not even the tasks or conditions of the project can be 
meaningfully specified beforehand. Some such projects may encompass task that are 
difficult to codify or formalize, and/or project participants who may shift over time, as the 
competences needed for the project may also shift over time.  
 
Coordination through Management  
In such projects that cannot be coordinated by specification in the above manner, what is 
needed in order to overcome incentive conflicts is not dominance nor specification, but 
management. A first element of such management is leadership, embodied in persons 
who mediate interest conflicts among project participants, through facilitating negotiation 
or through imposing or suggesting rules or actions. Similarly, many communication 
problems are not alleviated by dominance or specification. What is needed is competent 
boundary spanning (Tushmann & Katz 1980): Persons who spread information and 
compensate for cognitive distances among project participants, through stimulating 
                                          
9 A firm-organised project team may also, due to its temporary nature, develop some institutions 
such as routines, rules, codebooks, and information structuring institutions (such as information 
gatekeepers), however few and weak relative to those developed in stable teams. Hence, a project 
team may have to rely upon the general governance and incentive structures in the firm in which it 
is based, and these may be poorly suited for coordinating the specialized tasks of the project (in 
fact, the need for alternative coordination mechanisms may be the very reason that a project is 
administratively separated from the rest of the organization). 
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mutual learning or through imposing or suggesting solutions to cognitive coordination 
problems (Foss 2001). Some projects employ specialized boundary spanners or leaders 
⎯ the project may even have been set up by its leader. And in many cases, the leader 
and the boundary spanner of a project is one and the same person, having captured 
sufficient experience from the projects they have participated to earlier, to be capable of 
coordinating new projects, holding knowledge of (the majority of) the distributed 
competences and tasks included in particular project types, and all the tasks (and 
potential problems) related to coordinating them.10  
As mentioned, such leaders and boundary spanners are sometimes long-term employed 
by firms (in order to make it possible for these firm to use external skill-holders for 
projects). In some cases, however, leaders/boundary spanners are, themselves, 
independent freelancers. Such “freelancing managers” often specialize in possessing 
knowledge of which agents may be suitable for new projects (“know-who”), and have 
access to updated information (typically, through their personal networks) about different 
agents’ current skills and availability. Hence, such persons are also capable of managing 
the time aspect of project coordination: If demand opportunities change rapidly, projects 
need to be set up, changed, or terminated with short time limits. 
Some leaders and boundary spanners derive some of the above-mentioned all-round 
knowledge of the various skills and tasks involved in a project from a scientific logic 
(Grabher, 2002c), achieved, for example, at management schools. School courses need, 
however, to be highly tailored to specific industries and specific types of projects in order 
to provide students with the necessary insights. Many leaders and boundary spanners 
have instead learned from hands-on experience. Many have had jobs that allowed for 
contact with a range of different specialized skill-holders who typically participate to 
projects (this is also the way these people build the personal networks that give them 
access to information).11 Some have learned about the different skills and tasks involved 
in particular projects by having been around a range of different functions throughout 
their career, through employment in a range of different firms undertaking different 
project tasks.  
 
Embeddedness of managers and geographical clustering 
Some people managing market-based projects (i.e., leaders and boundary spanners) 
may have worked in different firms around the World, but many have learned how to 
lead projects and span cognitive boundaries through having an  ”apprenticeship” in a 
host of different firm within the same geographically limited area ⎯ typically a country, 
but in some cases, even a district or city where job opportunities within the same 
industry are particularly abundant. In this way, some of the skills of these managers 
become place-specific: They concern local skill-holders, under local conditions. Clearly, 
know-who is relevant only in the “community of practice” (Brown & Duguid 1991; 
Wenger 2000) where it was acquired, but many leadership or boundary-spanning skills 
may be of highest value in the place where they were acquired. The context specificity of 
skills and placeboundness of many project leaders and boundary spanners may help us 
understanding why many ecologies of projects are geographically clustered (Staber et al. 
1996; Porter 2000; Maskell 2001; Lorenzen 2002).  
                                          
10 In a resource-based terminology (e.g. Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993), we might say that such people possess dynamic capabilities ⎯ i.e., the abilities to 
constantly combine shifting assets (internal as external) in new valuable ways (Kogut and Zander, 
1992; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Teece et al., 1997), through being able to set up, coordinate, 
dissolve, and set up anew project networks, at the appropriate time and place, while keeping 
coordination problems at bay. Relatedly, Richard Normann (2001) focuses on firms and people 
capable of “reframing business” through continuously bundling new resources. 
11 Hence, ‘gatekeepers’ of information in firms or networks are often the same persons who 
possess project coordination skills. 
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Geographical clustering of project ecologies, itself, also facilitates coordination of market-
based projects, through the rise of local market institutions (Lorenzen 2002; Maskell and 
Lorenzen 2004). In a cluster with geographical proximity of people and firms, it is ceteris 
paribus, unlikely that neither skill-holders nor managers are total strangers before they 
enter into a project with each other, they may be linked by ”weak ties” (personal 
networks of ”friends’ friends” (Granovetter 1973)), and they may be part of a place-
specific ”epistemic” or ”interpretative” community (Grabher 2002b; Haas 1992). Such 
institutions are, thus, an example of positive external project economies that feed 
positively into the management of future projects.  
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION: THE RECORDED MUSIC INDUSTRY 
 
In the following, we shall illustrate our arguments by looking at an industry that is 
dependent upon a high rate of product innovation based on projects: The Recorded Music 
industry. The core product of this industry is music CDs, but songs scores (sheet music) 
and tunes or jingles for mobile phones, etc., also begin to play a role (Andersen and 
Miles 1999). Like many other Entertainment industries such as Films or Computer 
Games, the direct impact of Recorded Music upon many national economies is growing in 
terms of turnover, employment, and export. The industry has grown by 35% during the 
last decade, with turnovers rising from USD 27 billion to USD 37 billion (IFPI 2001), 
primarily due to technological and stylistic innovations and globalizing markets. It has 
players in every country, and even if a handful of major media conglomerates dominate 
it, local firms in virtually all European countries are profit earners in their own right 
(Power and Hallencreutz 2002). Again similar to other Entertainment industries, the 
Recorded Music industry has contributed to driving a range of supporting industries (for 
example ICT industries, the explosion of which is partly propelled by needs for producing, 
marketing, and distributing digital entertainment products).12 However, Recorded Music 
also shares the fate of other Entertainment industries in that its organization has so far 
been corresponded by only modest academic scrutiny (Lampel et al. 2000).  
Below, we shall sketch out how product innovation in the Recorded Music industry is 
based upon projects, and analyse why they are organized on the market and how they 
are managed. The empirical example is based upon extensive fieldwork during the period 
2002-2005 in the Entertainment industries (a range of literature studies as well as 
qualitative interviews with Danish and Scandinavian managers within the Music, Film, 
Fashion, Computer Games and Design industries, as reported in e.g. Lorenzen and 
Frederiksen (2003); Lorenzen and Maskell (2004), Maskel and Lorenzen (2004)).13 
 
Project-based product innovation in the Recorded Music Industry  
Product innovation in the Recorded Music industry is project-based because of the high 
demand uncertainty and economies of speed on the markets for its core product, the 
music CD. 
The firms in the Recorded Music industry  ⎯  i.e., record companies ⎯ serves consumer 
markets, and, contrary to some other Entertainment industries (such as theatres) that 
are run on a philanthropic basis and/or are subsidized by sponsors or the public and 
consequently have small audiences and are less dependent upon profits, Recorded Music 
is big business with global mass demand. Like other Entertainment firms, firms in the 
                                          
12 The Recorded Music industry has also been highly publicly visible and exerted extraordinary 
influences upon the molding of values, attitudes and life styles in society for many decades. 
13 See www.cbs.dk/imagine; www.nordicdesign.org; www.step.no/music for more information. 
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Recorded Music industry compete on product differentiation in terms of content, rather 
than price. Product prices are often standardized so much that competition revolves 
around product differentiation in terms of artistic content (and, of course, how this 
content is marketed).14 Simply put, in order to entertain, record companies have to 
continuously come up with new and original products, i.e., music CDs. Even if niche 
demands continue to exist (and seem to become more profitable with globalization and 
new technologies for digital distribution of music), the industry is characterized by mass 
demand. Some products achieve huge sales around the World. However, the problem is 
that these products are few, and that consumer tastes are so ambiguous that it is not 
possible to know beforehand which will succeed on a large scale (Negus 1992; Vogel 
1998; Huygens et al. 2002; Lopes 1992; Shuker 2001). Furthermore, life cycles of the 
core product, the music CD, are generally short (and even briefer for CD singles) and 
shortening.  
The result of these demand contingencies is that product innovation is organized in 
projects, in order to facilitate experimentation and product variety. When nobody knows 
which product is going to make it big, the strategy is to ensure a steady stream of novel 
CDs.15 Any release of music CDs is in a sense an open-ended search process, where new 
products need to be tested vis a vis an uncertain consumer demand, over limited test 
periods.16 
 
Why are music projects market-organized? 
The organization of product innovation projects within the Recorded Music industry can 
be explained by examining their nature of skill diversity and the complexity of innovation 
tasks.  
The Recorded Music industry is, as other Entertainment industries, part of the currently 
much-focused-upon “Creative” industries (e.g., Caves, 2000). In these industries, one 
core issue of organization is how the skill-holders who can provide such content (i.e., 
”creative” people, artists) are coordinated with those who hold the ”humdrum” skills, i.e., 
those of manufacturing, marketing, and distributing products (Caves 2000; Davis and 
Scase 2000). At the heart of this problem are the differing motivations of these skill-
holders, with archetypical artists often motivated intrinsically by a creative urge of 
communicating a message or a vision, and entrepreneurs or managers typically 
extrinsically motivated in terms of economic incentives.17  The skill-holders needed for a 
music innovation project are very diverse. Artists (musicians) undertake the first phase 
of innovation ⎯  what we may call “invention of music” ⎯ , i.e., songwriting and 
performance. However, the innovation of a music CD does not stop there: It also entails 
production, marketing and sales of the CD. This means that the tasks involved in 
production and marketing of a music CD encompass (at least) songwriting; performance; 
recording; production, mixing and sometimes remixing; mastering; contract writing and 
intellectual property rights management; graphical art design (AD); video production; 
and sales, promotion, and tour management. People holding these skills are usually very 
specialized within only one or few or these tasks, and are characterized by differing 
                                          
14 Such price standardization is a result of national tax regulations in combination with industry 
interest organizations. 
15 Like in film, the major companies (that can afford it) try to mitigate against uncertainty by 
engaging mega-stars with a huge following. In some (but not all) cases, this lowers the risk of a 
few select products, but the failure rate even of those firms and CDs is still significant. The hunt is 
still on for tomorrow’s stars: Those unknown acts who sell unexpectedly (such as the film Blair 
Witch Project; or the band Franz Ferdinand). 
16 The same goes, albeit to a less extent, for new national penetration efforts or marketing 
methods. 
17 These motivations are of course only stereotyped tendencies. 
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lifestyles and motivations. There are huge differences between the motivations of e.g. 
artists and marketing people. Hence, there are few internal economies of governance of 
entire CD projects within firms. 
Furthermore, there are few internal economies of planning music projects. Innovation of 
commercially marketed music products is a relatively quick endeavour, with many 
commercial CD projects running for less than a year.18 Compared to many projects in 
other industries (such as construction projects), there are also relatively few participants 
to music projects. As creating a new product is a complex patchwork of tasks, few 
participants partake to the entire project’s lifespan. In the production of a music CD, 
some skill-holders (e.g. those carrying out AD, promotion, and tour management) 
participate only at some stages, whereas performers remain in the project throughout, as 
they are needed not only for creating the musical content of the CD but also for 
marketing it through live and video performances. Often, product innovation is so open-
ended that it brings a need for flexibility. Consequently, its time frame may be altered, 
and some project participants, like musicians, producers or art designers may be fired 
from a project if it shifts course. With such shifting participation to CD projects, there are 
few internal economies of planning them. 
The result of high skill diversity and complexity of tasks is that product innovation 
projects within the Recorded Music industry are organised on the market. One economic 
agent, the record company, typically establishes and manages projects and is involved in 
all aspects of them. The record company first undertake search activities (i.e,. artist 
scouting), signs artists and then “pushes” the music through the other parts of the value 
adding process by signing on firms and freelancers with supplementary skills. Often, a 
publishing firm takes care of payments (collection of royalties) to artists and record 
companies after projects are over and may also sometimes be actively involved in 
signing artists and finding music content.  
Different record companies play different roles in music projects. The music industry has 
a duopolistic industry structure, with the branches of the four global major entertainment 
conglomerates (EMI, Sony BMG, Universal, and Warner) draw upon the superior 
distribution and marketing competencies, and small independent record companies using 
superior innovation capabilities.19 Focusing upon marketing and distribution, the major 
record companies assign the task of finding and signing artists to specialized Artist and 
Repertoire (A&R) personnel within their organization. Often having only modest skills 
with respect to music performance and production, and placed under heavy budget 
constraints, this A&R personnel often have difficulties in discovering, signing, and 
developing innovative artists. Smaller and independent record companies, on the other 
hand, often purely local in scope, typically have modest marketing skills, and very few 
have internalized distribution (Gander and Rieple 2002).20 However, they do have 
abundant internal skills and the personal networks needed to find, sign, and mature 
innovative artists, as some of their personnel often are artists themselves. As a result, on 
many national markets, the branches of the major global record companies use the 
national independent firms as “external product innovation labs”. Local firms may release 
national artists on their own, while artists perceived to hold great (global) sales potential 
are also licensed to major firms in order to utilize their larger marketing power and global 
                                          
18 Of course, product innovation of music out of the commercial mainstream may take many years 
or even decades. 
19 The reason for such massive concentration in the distribution and marketing activities in the 
industry is that the sunk costs (Sutton, 1991) in these activities are much larger than in innovation 
activities. Global marketing and distribution entails endogenous sunk costs (which are fixed and 
which any firm wanting to play that game need to pay), whereas sunk costs in innovation activities 
are mainly exogenous (variable), and decreasing due to technological changes in music recording 
and production (see Bakker, 2005, for a discussion of similar phenomena in the film industry). 
20 Consequently, most independent record companies keep marketing efforts at a minimum and 
rely upon networks (alliances) with each other and specialized distribution firms. 
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distribution channels and sales networks (Darmer 1999; Power and Hallencreutz 2002; 
STEP 2003). 
  
How are market-organised music projects managed? 
Some coordination of music projects is taking place on the basis of contracts.21 In 
particular, the major record companies use contracts to coordinate projects. In spite of a 
tendency of implementing still more contracts, e.g. in order to protect intellectual 
property rights, some tasks in music projects are still not subjectable to efficient contract 
coordination, and for many freelancers and independent record companies, handshake 
deals is still the preferred mode of collaboration. This is made possible by the fact that 
the market for skills within the Recorded Music industry is highly organized into distinct 
project ecologies, within which record companies, publishers, AD, media and event firms 
keep most project relations when producing new CDs (Power and Lundequist 2002; STEP 
2003).  
Within such Recorded Music ecologies, new project partners can easily be found, because 
many have worked together in earlier projects. As a result of the high number of finished 
projects in such ecologies, there is abundance of people who are skilled in managing 
music projects (i.e., A&R-responsible in the record companies, as well as a number of 
independent project coordinators). Such experienced managers, with know-how and 
know-who specialized to music projects, are central to coordination (and sometimes also 
initiation) of CD projects. 
 
What is the role of geographical clustering in the Recorded Music industry? 
Recorded Music ecologies are typically clustered in the major cities of the world (Scott 
1999; 2000)22. Here, we find national branches of major international record companies 
and publishers, the bulk of AD, media and event firms plus related legal and financial 
services, as well as many independent record companies and artists.23 The record 
companies alone are often found within a few hundred meters, in the city cores or in 
other high-prestige areas of the urban cluster (STEP 2003).24 One effect of this clustering 
is of course that it lowers time costs when running projects. However, the major positive 
effect of the clustering of managers with accumulated experience with project 
                                          
21 Compared to many other industries, there is a higher minimum degree of formalization within 
the Recorded Music industry, due to the importance of Intellectual Property Rights, which 
necessitate formalization in contracts and stipulations to a higher extent than in more traditional 
industries. 
22 Beside the national capitals project clusters in the Recorded Music industry are found in selected 
“creative cities” that are able to attract specialized and highly qualified “creative” labor (Florida, 
2002). This pattern of urban clustering is something the Recorded Music industry has in common 
with other Entertainment industries. 
23 Many young artists want to live in the cities, but many of the highest grossing artists and/or 
songwriters dwell in the countryside, with no clear localization pattern. These artists are more self-
contained in their creative process and entertain fewer project relations (depending more on long-
term network relations to record companies and publishers), and consequently less dependent on 
urban location. By contrast, younger artists often have more different project relations, shifting 
between labels, bands, performing often, and needing an abundance of weak ties to other artists to 
inspire their creative process. 
24 For example, a recent study of the Scandinavian Pop Music industry showed that, when labor 
market data is used, in Denmark, Pop Music firms cluster in the Greater Copenhagen, accounting 
for no less than 46% of all Danish firms within Pop Music (as defined by the NACE codes specified 
above). This is significant, as the general concentration of firms ⎯  meaning, Copenhagen's share 
of all Danish firms ⎯  is  only 19%. A minor cluster of firms was also found around the second 
largest Danish city, Aarhus accounting for 12% of all Pop Music firms (STEP, 2003). 
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coordination is their many weak ties and frequent interactions in the city space, making 
information about people’s and firms’ skills and availability accessible to all local firms. 
Furthermore, a relatively high level of social trust, facilitated by the frequent local 
interaction and information sharing among people within and around the industry, plus 
sets of canonical conventions for good and accepted conduct, which is safeguarded by 
reputation effects, lowers the transaction costs when new CD projects are initiated 
(Power and Lundequist 2002; Lorenzen and Frederiksen 2003).25 
This brief sketch of the organization of the Recorded Music industry suggests that we find 
geographical clusters in the industry because clustering allows for the management of 
experimental projects on the market. It seems paradoxical that such a local organization 
of the market facilitates a global industry. However, it is a fact that products developed 
through local projects are marketed and distributed globally through non-local networks. 
Whereas independent record companies, AD and event firms typically keep their relations 
local, major record companies participate to many clusters simultaneously and serve to 
connect them in global networks of distributing and selling products that have been 
sourced locally (Power and Hallencreutz 2002; STEP 2002). Allegedly, such local product 
sourcing in combination with global marketing is what has made the global major 
entertainment conglomerates so successful ⎯ even if products have been sourced mainly 
from a few countries.26  
Above, we have not attempted a full-scale analysis of the Recorded Music industry, nor a 
comparison to other project-based industries. Whether we may draw any general lessons 
about project organization and management from the Recorded Music industry ⎯  for 
instance, for other Entertainment industries, or merely industries that have high 
innovation rates ⎯  is not relevant here. The point of our analysis is an illustration of the 
theoretical argument outlined earlier. Through the example of the Recorded Music 
industry, we have rendered likely that our framework ⎯ focused upon the nature of 
product innovation and the skills and tasks this encompasses ⎯  allows for a fruitful 
analysis of why particular industries are project-based, why they are market-organized, 
and how they are managed.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
In the paper, we presented a framework for explaining the organization of projects and 
the management of projects organized on the market. Particular attention was paid to 
the organization and management of projects set up to facilitate product innovation in 
the guise of experimentation.  The paper has answered three research questions: 
                                          
25 Artistic inspiration and stylistic information related to production and marketing of music heavily 
depend on global pipelines of people and information, and such pipelines are in practice 
indispensably urban. Specialized educational institutions supplying new artistic talent, such as 
conservatories, or management schools offering “Project Management” or “Music Management” 
courses targeted at the Recorded Music industry, are located in major cities only. Furthermore, 
qualified labor is attracted by the diversity and global nature of large cities; and its skills are 
enhanced there (Maskell and Lorenzen, 2004). 
26 However, there are signs that this local-global system is now under duress with respect to 
Recorded Music. Due to a strategic race of acquiring independent companies, the global major 
record companies have become very dominant in a range of national Recorded Music industries, 
curbing the local innovative potential. Furthermore, as result of a temporary global drop in CD 
sales (often ascribed to piracy), the global majors have now cut back on their local sourcing of 
music and focused upon marketing a narrow range of mainly US and UK music globally. Such 
increased emphasis upon only some aspects of music projects (marketing) and a disconnection of 
the product “food chain” from independent record companies to global majors is, of course, likely 
to limit the extent of experimentation within the Recorded Music industry.  
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1. What determines the organization of projects? We are likely to see projects 
organized on the market rather than inside the boundaries of firms when projects 
need to include new and shifting resources and skills; and/or motivations of skill-
holders and the nature of tasks render internal governance and planning 
inefficient. 
2. How are market-organised projects managed? Markets become organized in 
combinations of people, contracts, and other institutions, in order to facilitate the 
coordination of market-based projects. While contracts play a role, a continuous, 
active role of knowledgeable managers (leaders and boundary spanners) is also 
necessary.  
3. What is the role of geographical clustering for such management? Managers 
undertaking leadership and boundary spanning on the market are embedded in 
project ecologies at particular places, which is why we see geographical clusters in 
many project-based industries. 
We undertook an analysis of the Recorded Music industry in order to illustrate our 
theoretical framework. This industry is characterized by demand uncertainty, economies 
of speed, and high skill division and task complexity within product innovation. The result 
is that product innovation is organized in projects to facilitate experimentation, and that 
these projects are carried out on the market rather that within firms. This is an efficient 
form of project organization only because of a high degree of organization and 
management of the market within the Recorded Music industry, in the guise of active 
leaders/boundary spanners, social institutions and geographical clustering in particular 
cities. 
The paper basically deals with disintegrated industries where neither Smiths (1776) 
“invisible hand” nor Chandler’s (1977) “visible” hand apply. We analyse how, in some 
industries, not just firms, but also markets are organized and managed  (Langlois, 1986), 
facilitating project-based innovation. The paper provides insights into both short and 
long-term, strategic aspects of the management of product experimentation and 
projects. Whereas each project may be seen as a short-term solution to a problem of 
product innovation (with related short-term managerial problems), in the longer, 
strategic, term, firms may manage product experimentation under high demand 
uncertainty through market-organized portfolios of projects, and this necessitates 
management of the market. The economies and management of portfolios of projects is 
not often addressed in the project literature, focusing mostly on stand-alone projects 
(Söderlund, 2004). 
The paper’s combination of two diverse research traditions, i.e. the research on projects 
vs. the economic organization tradition has allowed us to address some issues that, even 
if obviously central for project organization, nevertheless have been little analyzed in a 
theoretical perspective.  
First, the paper has devoted more attention to the nature of competencies (skills) than 
what is usual in the economics of organization literature. In this literature, it is a key 
assertion that institutions arising in order to coordinate different competencies determine 
industrial organization. In particular, Richardson (1972) argues that if competencies are 
complementary, they may be internalized in firms in order to facilitate their coordination. 
We unpack “competencies” somewhat further and argue that it is not just whether 
competencies are complementary or not that influences which institutions are needed to 
coordinate them. The different motivations and cognitive frames held by agents who hold 
the competencies in question also influence industrial organization. In particular, we 
point out that intrinsically motivated skill-holders may avoid internalization into firms 
even at substantial cost. 
Second, this led us to analysing an aspect that has been addressed earlier in the 
literature on projects, but never analysed in relation to the management and innovation 
issues of this industry: Labour markets. In our argument and empirical illustration, 
localized labour markets are centre stage for management of market-based projects as 
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well as of innovation. Existing research on labor has focused upon freelancers with 
“project careers” (DeFillippi & Arthur 1998; Faulkner & Anderson 1987; Grabher 2002a; 
Jones 1996), and “core” vs. “peripheral” labor, but rarely discussed how projects often 
rest upon the collaboration of skill-holders with both differing competencies and 
motivations, and how managers may address this problem.  
Third, the analysis of labour markets allowed us to address the issue of geographical 
clustering of many projects. Even if this clustering is easily empirically observable (see 
e.g. Scott 1999; 2000; Grabher 2002c), theoretical accounts for it within the project 
literature have been sparse indeed. Our use of arguments from the economics of 
organization literature in combination with our focus upon particular people on the labour 
market has allowed us to explain this clustering, and to point towards its role for 
management.  
Finally, through incorporating transaction cost economics (which has only to a very 
limited extent been discussed in the current literature on projects), the paper raised 
points pertaining to institutions and organization that may be of interest to scholars 
within both the proejct and economics of organization traditions. Foremost, rather than 
maintaining the classic dichotomy between firms (or, in Williamson’s (1985), term, 
hierarchies) as “institution” and markets as merely price signals among anonymous 
buyers and sellers, the paper has demonstrated that we can view markets as highly 
organized and subject to management in stable and semi-stable institutions. 
Understanding these institutions is as important in order to account for the organization 
of an industry, as it is to understand economies and diseconomies of internalization.  
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